Sortal concepts are at the center of certain logical discussions and have played a significant role in solutions to particular problems in philosophy. Apart from logic and philosophy, the study of sortal concepts has found its place in specific fields of psychology, such as the theory of infant cognitive development and the theory of human perception. In this monograph, different formal logics for sortal concepts and sortal-related logical notions are characterized. Most of these logics are intensional in nature and possess, (...) in addition, a bidimensional character. That is, they simultaneously represent two different logical dimensions. In most cases, the dimensions are those of time and natural necessity, and, in other cases, those of time and epistemic necessity. Another feature of the logics in question concerns second-order quantification over sortal concepts, a logical notion that is also represented in the logics. Some of the logics adopt a constant domain interpretation, others a varying domain interpretation of such quantification. Two of the above bidimensional logics are philosophically grounded on predication sortalism, that is, on the philosophical view that predication necessarily requires sortal concepts. Another bidimensional logic constitutes a logic for complex sortal predicates. These three sorts of logics are among the important novelties of this work since logics with similar features have not been developed up to now, and they might be instrumental for the solution of philosophically significant problems regarding sortal predicates. The book assumes a modern variant of conceptualism as a philosophical background. For this reason, the approach to sortal predicates is in terms of sortal concepts. Concepts, in general, are here understood as intersubjective realizable cognitive capacities. The proper features of sortal concepts are determined by an analysis of the main features of sortal predicates. Posterior to this analysis, the sortal-related logical notions represented in the above logics are discussed. There is also a discussion on the extent to which the set-theoretic formal semantic systems of the book capture different aspects of the conceptualist approach to sortals. These different semantic frameworks are also related to realist and nominalist approaches to sortal predicates, and possible modifications to them are considered that might represent those alternative approaches. (shrink)

We shall distinguish between sortal predication and standard predication. The former kind of predication necessarily involves sortal concepts but the latter, as it is customarily viewed, does not. It is generally thought that the only essential occurrence of a concept in a standard predication is the concept being predicated. In this paper, we shall put forward an alternative view. We shall propose to understand standard predication as a cognitive act essentially requiring sortal concepts. We shall call this view conceptual predication (...) sortalism and ground it on the basis of epistemic-semantic reasons. Concepts are understood as intersubjectively realizable capacities or abilities that fulfill particular cognitive roles, such as those of classification, categorization, individuation, and referring. (shrink)

Logic and philosophy of logic have increasingly become areas of research and great interest in Latin America and Spain, where significant work has been done and continues to be done in both of these fields. The goal of this volume is to draw attention to this work through a collection of original and unpublished papers by specialists from Latin America and Spain. Some of the papers are of importance for set-theory and model theory. They cover topics such as the foundations (...) of paraconsistency, the use of paraconsistent logic as a basis for set-theory, and the methodological aspects in both the justification of new axioms in set theory and the formalization of pre-theoretic notions. Other papers are related to epistemic logic. They deal with the issues of abduction and the choice of the simplest hypothesis, the definition of group probability, and the nature of explanation and understanding in such logic. There are also papers on logical paradoxes, the semantics of names, and the nature of relations. Max A. Freund is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the University of Costa Rica and the National University of Costa Rica. He is co-author of the book Modal Logic its syntax and semantics, as well as the author of Judicial Logic, and of a forthcoming book The Logic of Sortals. Max Fernandez de Castro is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Mexico. He is the author of the book Quine y la Ontologíaa and co-author of the books Lógica Matemática I: lógica proposicional, intuicionista y modal, Lógica Matemática II: clásica, intuicionista y modal, Teoría de Conjuntos, Lógica y Temas Afines I. Marco Ruffino is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Campinas and the editor of Manuscrito, the Brazilian international journal for Analytic Philosophy. He has many publications, in important philosophical journals, in the philosophy of language, of logic, and of mathematics; in the history of analytic philosophy, and on Frege and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

We consider a formal language whose logical syntax involves both modal and tense propositional operators, as well as sortal quantifiers, sortal identities and (second order) quantifiers over sortals. We construct an intensional semantics for the language and characterize a formal logical system which we prove to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics. Conceptualism is the philosophical background of the semantic system.

With the past and future tense propositional operators in its syntax, a formal logical system for sortal quantifiers, sortal identity and (second order) quantification over sortal concepts is formulated. A completeness proof for the system is constructed and its absolute consistency proved. The completeness proof is given relative to a notion of logical validity provided by an intensional semantic system, which assumes an approach to sortals from a modern form of conceptualism.

El artículo formula una interpretación de la computabilidad desde la perspectiva del conceptualismo realista. En esta interpretación, la noción central es la de concepto computable, el cual se entiende como cierto tipo de capacidad cognitiva. Aquí se muestra cómo difiere esa interpretación conceptualista de la clásica, denominada teoría de la computabilidad efectiva, en la cual el concepto fundamental es el de algoritmo; también se discute la relación entre estas dos interpretaciones. La discusión explora las consecuencias de la idea de que (...) los contenidos de los conceptos computables se pueden expresar en algoritmos. En un apéndice se plantean, muy brevemente, las diferencias entre el enfoque conceptualista de la computabilidad y otros dos enfoques no clásicos: el intuicionista y el representacionista./// This paper formulates an interpretaron of computability from the perspective of realist conceptualism. The key notion within this theory is that of a computable concept, where a concept is a cognitive capacity of a certain sort. Differences and connections between the conceptualist interpretation and the classical one, customarily referred to as the theory of effective computability, for which the key concept is that of an algoríthm, are shown in the text. Consequences of the idea that the content of computable concepts can be expressed in algoríthms are explored. An appendix briefly outlines how the present conceptualist approach differs from two other non-classical interpretations of computability, the intuitionist and the representationist. (shrink)

An intensional semantic system for languages containing, in their logical syntax, sortal quantifiers, sortal identities, (second-order) quantifiers over sortals and the necessity operator is constructed. This semantics provides non-standard assignments to predicate expressions, which diverge in kind from the entities assigned to sortal terms by the same semantic system. The nature of the entities assigned to predicate expressions shows, at the same time, that there is an internal semantic connection between those expressions and sortal terms. A formal logical system is (...) formulated that is proved to be absolutely consistent, sound and complete with respect to the intensional semantic system. (shrink)

A formal logical system for sortal quantifiers, sortal identity and (second order) quantification over sortal concepts is formulated. The absolute consistency of the system is proved. A completeness proof for the system is also constructed. This proof is relative to a concept of logical validity provided by a semantics, which assumes as its philosophical background an approach to sortals from a modern form of conceptualism.

Conceptual realism (a logico-philosophical semantic theory) has introduced a logical distinction between the cognitive structure of an assertion and its truth-conditions. We shall argue that the cognitive structure is part of the meaning of an assertion and that, consequently, should be taken into account when interpreting a natural language. We shall also explore this topic in relation to the problem of radical interpretation. The distinction will be made evident by first formulating a logical system (having conceptual realism as its philosophical (...) background) and then exhibiting it in the formal system. This will be preceded by a description of the main philosophical features of conceptual realism. (shrink)

We develop a set-theoretic semantics for Cocchiarella's second-order logical system . Such a semantics is a modification of the nonstandard sort of second-order semantics described, firstly, by Simms and later extended by Cocchiarella. We formulate a new second order logical system and prove its relative consistency. We call such a system and construct its set-theoretic semantics. Finally, we prove completeness theorems for proper normal extensions of the two systems with respect to certain notions of validity provided by the semantics.

This dissertation constitutes an inquiry into the formal aspects of a particular form of conceptual intentional realism: Holistic Realist Ramified Conceptualism. Several axiomatic systems, which have this theory as their philosophical background are developed and/or studied from a syntactical and semantical point of view. ;Among systems studied are Cocchiarella's RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$. A set theoretical semantics for these systems is developed. Also, completeness theorems with respect to certain extensions of RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and certain notions of validity related to that (...) semantics are proved. A relative consistency proof of RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$, HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and other systems is given. ;An axiomatic system for identity free realist ramified conceptualism involving indiscernibility relative to constructive concepts is developed. A set theoretical semantics for this system is constructed. A completeness theorem with respect to certain extensions of the identity-free system and a notion of validity related to that semantics is proved. ;Epistemic considerations are brought into this inquiry by introducing an epistemic operator into the logical syntax. Such an operator corresponds intuitively to the idea of constructive knowability. A philosophical discussion of this idea is presented and on the basis of this discussion an epistemic logical theory is formulated. It is shown that this system has HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ as a proper subsystem. On the basis of the epistemic logical theory, an axiomatic system is introduced from which Peano's arithmetic is deduced. In this way, it is shown that arithmetic can be developed axiomatically on conceptualist foundations. (shrink)

We present a relative consistency proof for second order systemRRC* and for certain important extensions of this system. The proof proceeds as follows: we prove first the equiconsistency of the strongest of such extensions (viz., systemH RRC*+(/CP**)) with second order systemT * . Now, N. Cocchiarella has shown thatT * is relatively consistent to systemT*+Ext; clearly, it follows thatH RRC*+(/CP**) is relatively consistent toT*+E xt. As an immediate consequence, the relative consistency ofRRC* and the other extensions also follows, being all (...) of them subsystems ofH RRC*+(/CP**). (shrink)

In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision and philosophical insight.

What does it mean for men to join with women in preventing sexual assault and domestic violence? This book, based on life history interviews with men and women anti-violence activists, illuminates both the promise of men's violence prevention work, as well as the strains and tensions that inhere, both for men as feminist allies, and for the women they work with.

As a leading member of the Vienna Circle, Rudolph Carnap's aim was to bring about a "unified science" by applying a method of logical analysis to the empirical data of all the sciences. This work, first published in English in 1934, endeavors to work out a way in which the observation statements required for verification are not private to the observer. The work shows the strong influence of Wittgenstein, Russell, and Frege.

We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...) aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor. (shrink)

Need considerations play an important role in empirically informed theories of distributive justice. We propose a concept of need-based justice that is related to social participation and provide an ethical measurement of need-based justice. The β-ε-index satisfies the need-principle, monotonicity, sensitivity, transfer and several »technical« axioms. A numerical example is given.

It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the (...) mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility. (shrink)

In his article ‘Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism’ (Religious Studies, 42 (2006), 177-191) Stephen Maitzen develops a novel version of the atheistic argument from divine hiddenness according to which the lopsided distribution of theistic belief throughout the world’s populations is much more to be expected given naturalism than given theism. I try to meet Maitzen’s challenge by developing a theistic explanation for this lopsidedness. The explanation I offer appeals to various goods that are intimately connected with the human (...) cognitive constitution, and in particular, with the way in which we depend upon social belief forming practices for our acquisition of much of our knowledge about the world – features about us that God would value but that also make probable a lopsided distribution of theistic belief, or so I argue. (shrink)

There is now a burgeoning literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) against moral beliefs, but perhaps surprisingly, a relatively small literature on EDAs against religious beliefs. There is an even smaller literature comparing the two. This essay aims to further the investigation of how the two sorts of arguments compare with each other. To begin with, I shall offer some remarks on how to best formulate these arguments, focusing on four different formulations that one can discern in the literature and (...) that can be applied to both sorts of beliefs. I shall then go on to make a series of comparisons regarding the relative vulnerabilities of moral beliefs and theistic religious beliefs to these four arguments, suggesting that there are a number of respects in which theistic religious beliefs are somewhat less liable than moral beliefs to be undercut by EDAs. (shrink)

Ted Shotter's founding of the London Medical Group 50 years ago in 1963 had several far reaching implications for medical ethics, as other papers in this issue indicate. Most significant for the joint authors of this short paper was his founding of the quarterly Journal of Medical Ethics in 1975, with Alastair Campbell as its first editor-in-chief. In 1980 Raanan Gillon began his 20-year editorship . Gillon was succeeded in 2001 by Julian Savulescu, followed by John Harris and Soren Holm (...) in 2004, with Julian Savulescu starting his second and current term in 2011. In 2000 an additional special edition of the JME, Medical Humanities , was published, under the founding joint editorship of Martyn Evans and David Greaves. In 2003 Jane Macnaughton succeeded David Greaves as joint editor. Deborah Kirklin, under whose auspices MH became an independent journal, took over in 2008, and she was succeeded in 2013 by Sue Eckstein. This short paper offers reminiscences and reflections from the two journals’ various editors.From the start the JME was committed to clearly expressed reasoned discussion of ethical issues arising from or related to medical practice and research. In particular, both Edward Shotter and Alastair Campbell, each a cleric , were at pains to make clear that the JME was not a religious journal and that it had no sort of partisan axe to grind.Campbell's appointment as founding editor was something of a surprise, as the original intention had been to appoint a medical doctor, who could be expected to know medical practice from the inside. However, in 1972 Campbell, a Joint Secretary of the Edinburgh Medical Group, had published Moral dilemmas in medicine. …. (shrink)

On a standard understanding of externalist metasemantic theories, such theories require a speaker to defer to other speakers in order to share content with them. We argue that this standard understanding is mistaken, and that, on a proper understanding of externalism, sharing content does not depend in any way on deference, either to experts, or one’s linguistic community. We defend a version of externalism that we call ‘pure externalism’, and we argue that the idea that shared content requires deference is (...) a residue of internalism/descriptivisism to which externalists ought to be opposed. We also argue that, despite common belief to the contrary, several of the originators of externalism, including Tyler Burge, do not think that deference is in any way relevant, let alone required, for shared externalist content. (shrink)

Graphene is a nanomaterial with many promising and innovative applications, yet early studies indicate that graphene may pose risks to humans and the environment. According to ideas of responsible research and innovation, all relevant actors should strive to reduce risks related to technological innovations. Through semi-structured interviews, we investigated the idea of graphene as a risk held by two types of key actors: graphene researchers and innovation advisors at universities, where the latter are facilitating the movement of graphene from the (...) laboratory to the marketplace. The most common idea found is that graphene is not a risk due to, e.g., low toxicity, low amounts produced/used, and its similarity to harmless materials. However, some researchers and advisors also say that graphene is a risk, e.g., under certain conditions or due to a lack of risk-related information. We explain the co-existence of these seemingly contradictory ideas through the semantic ambiguity of the word risk and a risk/no-risk rhetoric, where risks are mentioned rhetorically only to be disregarded as manageable or negligible. We suggest that some of the ideas held by the researchers and innovation advisors constitute a challenge to responsible research and innovation regarding graphene. At the same time, we acknowledge the dilemma that the discourse of responsible innovation creates for the actors: denying graphene risks makes them irresponsible due to a lack of risk awareness, while affirming graphene risks makes them irresponsible due to their everyday engagement in graphene development. We therefore recommend more research into what researchers and innovation advisors should do in practice in order to qualify as responsible. (shrink)

This is Volume V of twenty-two of a collection on 20th Century Philosophy. Originally published in 1964, this collection contains original papers assembled and representative in their styles, methods, and preoccupations. The various problems here discussed where to the author both important and unsolved: if others are stimulated to make further progress in solving them, the main purpose of this collection will have been achieved.

Collection of essays previously published by Max Jorge Hinderer Cruz, a Bolivian-German writer, curator and philosopher. From 2019 to 2020 he was the director of Bolivia's National Museum of Art (Museo Nacional de Arte, MNA) in La Paz. "The texts that make up this publication appeared in the newspaper La Razón, of La Paz, between October 13, 2019 and August 24, 2021, the first five in the supplement "Tendencias" and the remaining three in the section "Voces". At the end of (...) each one the respective date is recorded. The general revision that was made for this edition does not alter the spirit of the texts, written in difficult times for our country." --Editorial note. (shrink)

This collection of essays and interviews addresses important theoretical, philosophical and creative issues in Western art music at the end of the twentieth- and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. The book offers a wide range of international perspectives from prominent musicologists, philosophers and composers.Part I is mainly theoretical in emphasis. Issues addressed include the historical rationalization of music and technology, new approaches to the theorization of atonal harmony in the wake of Spectralism, debates on the 'new complexity', the heterogeneity, (...) pluralism and stylistic omnivorousness that characterizes music in our time, and the characterization of twentieth-century and contemporary music as a 'search for lost harmony'. The orientation of Part II is mainly philosophical, examining concepts of totality and inclusivity in new music. Part III offers creative perspectives, with new essays and interviews from important contemporary composers. A concluding essay by Alastair Williams provides a postlude to the book, while the whole collection is prefaced by an extended introductory chapter by Max Paddison which provides a context of ideas, and traces many of the issues discussed back to Adorno's seminal notion of une musique informelle. (shrink)

Max Weber analyzes the science of the Modern Period. The revolution in physics at the beginning of the 20th century, the creation of quantum mechanics bring to the fore another type of scientific thinking. It is important to note that past knowledge in this case is not refuted, not destroyed, it becomes marginal and enters into communication with its competitor. It is this type of communication with Weber’s philosophy of scientific thinking that helps us to understand its specificity. According to (...) Weber, new knowledge is derived from the previous one, refuting its truth. On this basis, Weber writes that science is different from the art, where the created works retain their significance regardless of the time when they were created. For modern science the predecessor is necessary as another, without which not any communication is possible. Classical science, about which Weber writes, is necessary and continues to function. Satisfying the reemerging needs of society, it can detect previously hidden possibilities and, at the same time, encourage new scientific thinking to strengthen its position.The concept of revolution disappears gradually from the works on science. Instead, sociological concepts such as an innovation center or a technopark that combine simultaneously changes in the logic of knowledge and in the technical equipment of society are becoming popular. Logical and social characteristics of science are combined, the boundary between them becomes less noticeable. If in the era of classics the artificial world surrounding man was built on the basis of the laws of nature, now it is being created on the basis of the laws of thinking. For Weber, this world was silent and dead, this is what classical science testified to. Now the world around us is endowed with artificial intelligence, and we must be able to communicate with it. To understand Weber, it is necessary to establish contact with the world of classics, and not to try to destroy it and to declare it worthless. (shrink)

Mohan Matthen holds that visual perceptual content is divided into descriptive and referential elements. Descriptive content is our awareness of sensory features belonging to objects located in the visual field. Matthen conceives of this in terms of an image. The referential element is a demonstrative form of content, by which we pick out those objects as particulars and assert their physical presence. Matthen terms this ‘the feeling of presence’. Together, they make up the ‘assembled message’ that visual states present to (...) the perceiver in perceptual experience. I argue that the two elements cannot play together as Matthen envisages. Beginning with the referential element, I show that the feeling of presence is unable to both provide demonstrative reference and assert that the visual state reflects how things are. Turning to the descriptive element, I argue that Matthen is committed to a view on which descriptive (or image) content is a mental entity, a reified image. This is a common element across perceptual experience, episodic memory and visual imagination. The mental entity proves a defective ingredient in assembling perceptual content that purports to present reality. There are problems integrating the depicted viewpoint with the subject’s actual viewpoint, and problems maintaining a coherent notion of assertion. I argue that the project of assembling perceptual experience from descriptive and referential elements is unworkable. (shrink)

RESUMENporque somos finitos, porque hay límite, hay sentido. Asimismo, en la medida que precisamente somos, constituyendo tal límite, hay comunidad. Aquello que la configura es el despliegue del sentido. Con lo del sentido, lo que se aborda aquí es la esencia de una misma comunidad, una comunidad sin nombre. En este trabajo se revela la intensidad de su despliegue, en su cierre (Schmitt) y apertura (Derrida).PALABRAS CLAVESentido, finitud, decisión, Schmitt, DerridaABSTRACTBecause we are finite, because there is limit, there is sense. (...) Likewise, insofar as we are precisely, constituting such limit, there is community. It is the display of sense what forms it. With the sense issue, what we approach here is the essence of a community itself, a community without name. In this work we disclose the intensity of its display, in its closing (Schmitt) and opening (Derrida).KEYWORDSSense, finiteness, decision, Schmitt, Derrida. (shrink)